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BUCKING WHITE STALLION: WHY EPA 
SHOULD HAVE PROHIBITED COST 
CONSIDERATIONS FROM CLEAN AIR ACT 
EGU REGULATORY DESIGNATIONS AND 
WHY THE D.C. CIRCUIT WOULD HAVE 
UPHELD IT 
SAMUEL WORTH* 
Abstract: In 2012 the Environmental Protection Agency issued a Final Rule sub-
jecting coal and oil-fired electric utility steam generating units, or EGUs, to EPA 
regulation under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, officially listing them as 
“source-categories” of Hazardous Air Pollutant, or HAP, emissions. Additionally, 
the agency held that situation-specific factors, such as implementation and com-
pliance costs, should not be considered when designating EGUs for regulation. In 
White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the CAA does not require 
EPA to consider implementation and compliance costs when designating coal and 
oil-fired EGUs for regulation. The legislative purpose and statutory language of 
CAA section 112, however, supports a finding that EPA is actually barred from 
such cost consideration. This Comment argues that in light of the D.C. Circuit’s 
holding in White Stallion, EPA could have interpreted section 112 in its 2012 Fi-
nal Rule to completely prohibit the agency from considering EGU regulatory 
compliance costs. If EPA had taken a stronger position on the statutory bar to 
cost consideration, the D.C. Circuit would have affirmed the agency’s decision as 
the correct interpretation of section 112. Such a holding, in turn, would have en-
sured more environmentally friendly decision-making for years to come.  
INTRODUCTION 
In the third century B.C., the Chinese emperor Qin Shinhuang, in an ef-
fort to achieve immortality, directed his court doctors and alchemists to con-
coct an elixir that could halt or perhaps even reverse his body’s natural aging 
process.1 He began taking mercury, having observed that bodily decay was 
stunted in persons with prolonged exposure to the substance.2 Before long, the 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2014–2015. 
 1 See DAVID CURTIS WRIGHT, THE HISTORY OF CHINA 49 (Frank W. Thackeray et al. eds., 2001) 
(detailing the emperor’s use of mercury to combat aging and later death). 
 2 Id. 
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first emperor of the Qin dynasty was dead—believed to have been poisoned, in 
a cruel twist of fate, by the very mercury intended to grant him eternal life.3 
Today, it is well known that mercury is toxic to the central and peripheral 
nervous systems.4 Humans who are exposed to mercury are not the only organ-
isms at risk of severe health problems; wildlife and entire ecosystems can also 
be adversely affected by contact with the toxin.5 In 1970, Congress passed the 
Clean Air Act (“CAA”) to empower the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to reduce air emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants (“HAPs”).6 Since 
that time, there has been increasing recognition of the dangers of mercury as 
an air pollutant and of the need to control mercury emissions.7 Nevertheless, 
the question of who should bear the costs associated with mercury emissions 
reductions has proven contentious.8 
In an effort to better understand the economics of clean air, Congress di-
rected EPA to conduct a study to estimate the pecuniary costs and benefits of 
the CAA.9 In the study, EPA estimated that the economic benefits of the CAA 
amounted to an average of $22.2 trillion from 1970 to 1990, and appraised the 
costs of complying with the statute’s standards at $500 billion.10 Further, since 
1970, the CAA has improved human health and welfare, which has led to 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Id. 
 4 See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-Fired Elec-
tric Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9354 (Feb. 16, 2012) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 
63) (identifying mercury as a toxic substance); Mercury and Health Fact Sheet No361, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 2013), www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs361/en/, archived at http://perma.
cc/LB2B-29F7 (discussing health effects of mercury on the central and peripheral nervous systems). 
 5 See Anthony DePalma, Mercury’s Harmful Reach Has Grown, Study Suggests, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/science/study-finds-mercury-in-more-northeastern-
bird-species.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print, archived at http://perma.cc/4562-RMXP (discussing 
adverse effects of mercury on wildlife and ecosystems); Mercury and Health Fact Sheet No 361, supra 
note 4 (discussing health effects of mercury on humans). 
 6 See History of the Clean Air Act, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/
amendments.html#caa70 (last updated Aug. 15, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/N7LA-9JHB (dis-
cussing the history of the CAA and EPA power to reduce hazardous and toxic air pollutants). 
 7 See Final Brief for State and Local Government Intervenors-Respondent in Support of EPA at 2, 
White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 12-
1100), 2013 WL 1386233, at *2 (noting concerns over mercury by state interveners); ENVTL. HEALTH 
& ENG’G INC., EMISSIONS OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS FROM COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS 1, 
18 (2011), available at http://www.lung.org/assets/documents/healthy-air/coal-fired-plant-hazards.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Z7MV-CF3Q (noting thirty-nine have issued warnings relating to the 
dangers of mercury consumption). 
 8 See Al Bredenberg, The Clean Air Act—Was It Worth the Cost?, THOMASNET.COM (Oct. 31, 
2011), http://news.thomasnet.com/IMT/2011/10/31/the-clean-air-act-was-it-worth-the-cost/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/S46J-VR4U (observing that political forces are debating the controversial question 
of who should bear the cost of regulation). 
 9 See JANE Q. KOENIG, HEALTH EFFECTS OF AMBIENT AIR POLLUTION: HOW SAFE IS THE AIR 
WE BREATHE? 131 (2000) (noting Congress directed EPA to conduct a study of the costs and benefits 
of the CAA). 
 10 Id. 
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longer lives and significant savings through reduced health-care expenses and 
increased work efficiency.11 Despite an abundance of scientific evidence indi-
cating that the benefits of the CAA far outweigh the costs, petitioners have 
continually asked courts to direct EPA to weigh implementation and compli-
ance costs in its regulatory policymaking.12 In White Stallion Energy Center, 
LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit held that the CAA does not require EPA to consider implementa-
tion and compliance costs when designating coal and oil-fired electric utility 
steam generating units (“EGUs”) for regulation.13 
This Comment argues that EPA could have interpreted CAA section 112 
to entirely bar the agency from considering EGU implementation and compli-
ance costs when enacting regulations on EGUs, rather than to merely not re-
quire the agency to do so.14 EPA could have taken a stronger position on 
costs—one that precludes the possibility of including industry implementation 
and compliance expenses in the regulatory calculus—and in so doing, une-
quivocally prioritized public health and welfare over compliance expenses and 
corporate balance sheets.15 Had the agency adopted this position, this Com-
ment argues that, in light of the D.C. Circuit’s holding in White Stallion, the 
court would have upheld EPA’s interpretation of section 112.16 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The hazardous effects of mercury emissions have been well documented by 
the scientific community.17 Elemental mercury, once released into the environ-
ment, is transformed by bacteria into the organic compound methylmercury, 
which is highly toxic, extremely bioavailable,18 and biomagnifies19 in aquatic 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See J. SCOTT HOLLADAY, INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, VALUING 
THE CLEAN AIR ACT: HOW DO WE KNOW HOW MUCH CLEAN AIR IS WORTH? 1, 11–12 (2011), 
available at http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Valuing_the_Clean_Air_Act.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/85JV-D4LP (discussing how savings are achieved through the CAA); Bredenberg, 
supra note 8 (describing estimated savings under the CAA). 
 12 See Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 647 F.2d 1130, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (not-
ing petitioners request that the court consider an EPA mandate to consider costs of CAA implementa-
tion and compliance); Bredenberg, supra note 8 (discussing benefits of the CAA in light of costs). 
 13 White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 748 F.3d 1222, 1236, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 
2014). 
 14 See infra notes 87–105 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 87–105 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 105–107 and accompanying text. 
 17 See Mercury, GREENFACTS, http://www.greenfacts.org/en/mercury/mercury-1.htm (last updat-
ed Feb. 6, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/XG57-RH4L; DePalma, supra note 5. 
 18 Bioavailability, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bioavailability 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/HV7H-XK7S (defining bioavailability as the 
degree and rate at which a substance—as a drug—is absorbed into a living system or is made available at 
the site of physiological activity). 
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food chains.20 Mercury exposure can have devastating neurological effects on 
living organisms and it can also disrupt microbiological activity in soils that are 
vital to terrestrial food chains.21 The effects of mercury emissions are highly de-
structive and even lethal.22 Humans—especially unborn children and subsistence 
fish-eating populations—are particularly susceptible to the risk of mercury poi-
soning.23 Wildlife and entire ecosystems also stand to be destroyed by toxic mer-
cury emissions.24 
EPA has identified mercury from coal and oil-fired EGUs as the HAP of 
“greatest potential concern” to public health and the environment.25 An EGU is 
a fossil fuel-fired combustion unit of more than twenty-five megawatts that 
serves a generator for the production of sellable energy.26 Coal and oil-fired 
EGUs represent the largest source of human-generated mercury emissions in 
the United States.27 In 2010 alone, coal-fired EGUs in the United States re-
leased sixty tons of mercury, and oil-fired EGUs released an additional point-
one-three tons.28  
Enacted in 1970, section 112 of the CAA (or “the Act”) originally re-
quired EPA to reduce HAPs—defined as “an air pollutant to which no ambient 
air quality standard is applicable and which in the judgment of the Administra-
tor [of EPA] may cause, or contribute to, an increase in mortality or an increase 
in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness.”29 The statute fur-
                                                                                                                           
 19 Biomagnification, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/biomagnifi-
cation (last visited Feb. 18, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/YH44-3E35 (defining biomagnification as 
the process by which a compound, such as a pollutant or pesticide, increases its concentration in the tis-
sues of organisms as it travels up the food chain). 
 20 Mercury and Health Fact Sheet No361, supra note 4. 
 21 INTER-ORG. PROGRAMME FOR THE SOUND MGMT. OF CHEMICALS, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T 
PROGRAMME, GLOBAL MERCURY ASSESSMENT 72, 80 (2002), available at http://www.chem.unep.ch/
mercury/Report/Chapter5.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/XY8X-M9NG. 
 22 Id. at 75. 
 23 White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 748 F.3d 1222, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(stating that mercury becomes concentrated in the bodies of predatory fish, which are then consumed 
by humans; also noting that the toxin can easily pass from pregnant women to their fetuses). 
 24 DePalma, supra note 5. 
 25 OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY & STANDARDS, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 1 STUDY OF HAZARDOUS 
AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC UTILITY STEAM GENERATING UNITS—FINAL REPORT 
TO CONGRESS, at ES-27 (1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/t3/reports/eurtc1.pdf, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/4Z8L-Y996. 
 26 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(8) (2012). 
 27 Regulatory Findings on the Emission of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Electric Utility Steam 
Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,827 (Envtl. Prot. Agency Dec. 20, 2000) (notice); see Jim 
Marston, Texans to Benefit from Vital Clean Air Safeguards, ENVTL. DEF. FUND (Apr. 15, 2014), 
http://www.edf.org/media/texans-benefit-vital-clean-air-safeguards, archived at 
http://perma.cc/ZY33-ZVQJ; Mercury and Health Fact Sheet No361, supra note 4 (discussing health 
effects of mercury on humans). 
 28 OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY & STANDARDS, supra note 25, at ES-5. 
 29 Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1685 (1970) (later amended 
in 1977 and 1990). 
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ther mandated that EPA list each HAP for which it intended to establish an 
emission standard, thus providing enough safety to protect public health.30 
By 1990, however, EPA had only listed eight HAPs and established emis-
sion standards for only seven of them; for those seven, it addressed only a lim-
ited number of possible emission sources.31 Because EPA was moving so slow-
ly, in 1990, Congress amended section 112, listing 189 HAPs for EPA to regu-
late, and directing EPA to list categories of “major sources” or “area sources” 
emitting them.32 For each listed category or subcategory, section 112 requires 
EPA to promulgate emission standards that will protect public health within 
acceptable margins of safety.33 Among the HAPs listed in the 1990 amendment 
was “mercury compounds,” which includes any unique chemical that contains 
mercury.34 
In 2000, EPA found that it was appropriate and necessary to regulate coal 
and oil-fired EGUs under the CAA, and added them to the list of sources sub-
ject to regulation under the 1990 amendment.35 In 2005, however, EPA re-
versed the finding that EGUs were subject to regulation and removed them 
from the list.36 EPA reversed its determination on a number of grounds.37 No-
tably, EPA determined that various situation-specific factors, such as imple-
mentation and compliance costs, might reasonably affect whether an EGU is 
subject to regulation.38 In 2012, in a Final Rule,39 EPA again reversed course, 
and reaffirmed its initial 2000 finding that EGUs are subject to regulation un-
der section 112.40 The Agency overturned the determinations it made in 2005, 
including its finding that other situation-specific factors, such as implementa-
tion and compliance costs, should be considered when designating EGUs for 
regulation.41 
                                                                                                                           
 30 Id. 
 31 White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 748 F.3d 1222, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 32 Id. 
 33 See id. 
 34 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (2012) (noting that “compounds” refers to any unique chemical 
containing the named substance). 
 35 Nick Hutson, Regulations, in MERCURY CONTROL FOR COAL-DERIVED GAS STREAMS 45, 47 
(Evan J. Granite et al. eds., 2014). 
 36 Id. 
 37 White Stallion, 748 F.3d at 1232. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Frequently Asked Questions About Dockets: The Rulemaking Process, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/dockets/faqs.htm#112 (last updated Aug. 21, 2014), archived at http://perma.
cc/C52K-8LRE. 
 40 Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Electric Utility Steam 
Generating Units, 65 Fed.Reg. 79,825, 79,826 (Dec. 20, 2000). 
 41 White Stallion, 748 F.3d at 1232–33. 
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Reducing EGU HAP emissions to an acceptable level can be costly for 
industry.42 EPA’s own estimates place the cost of compliance in excess of $9 
billion annually.43 Industry leaders have argued that complying with EPA’s 
regulations will force EGUs out of the energy market and permanently retire a 
significant segment of the U.S. coal-fired energy generation capacity.44 The 
U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that the Final Rule will shut 
down one-sixth of all U.S. coal-fired EGUs by 2016.45 
EPA’s Final Rule was challenged in the D.C. Circuit on a number of 
grounds by state, industry, labor, and environmental entities (together the 
“Joint Petitioners”) in the consolidated action White Stallion Energy Center v. 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.46 Industry petitioners asserted that 
even if EPA had correctly interpreted portions of the CAA, the emission stand-
ards that the agency set out in the Final Rule were flawed.47 Environmental 
petitioners challenged the provisions of the Final Rule that allow compliance 
with emission standards to be demonstrated through emissions averaging and 
options for non-mercury metal HAP emissions monitoring.48 Julander Energy, 
an oil and natural gas company, petitioned for the adoption of stricter emission 
standards requiring EGUs to switch from coal to natural gas.49 Finally, state, 
industry and labor petitioners challenged EPA’s interpretation that the provi-
sion of the CAA regulating EGUs, section 112, precludes consideration of im-
plementation and compliance costs.50 
The EGU provision states, “[t]he Administrator shall regulate electric util-
ity steam generating units under this section, if the Administrator finds such 
regulation is appropriate and necessary . . . .”51 Joint Petitioners argue that EPA 
unlawfully constrained the factors it may consider when interpreting the terms 
“appropriate” and “necessary” in the statute.52 In relevant part, the petitioners 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *19−20, Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
135 S. Ct. 889 (2014), petition for cert. filed, 2014 WL 3530750 (2014) (No. 14-47). 
 43 Id. 
 44 Joint Brief of State, Industry and Labor Petitioners at 24, White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 12-1100). The U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
has expressed concerns that the Final Rule could raise electricity rates, stifle economic development, 
and even compromise the reliability of our electric grid. Sean Hackbarth, It’s Only Common Sense for 
EPA to Consider Costs When Regulating Power Plants, Appeals Judge Says, U.S. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE (Apr. 15, 2014, 4:30 PM), https://www.uschamber.com/blog/it-s-only-common-sense-
epa-consider-costs-when-regulating-power-plants-appeals-judge-says, archived at http://perma.cc/
MX4C-WANS. 
 45 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 19–20. 
 46 White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 748 F.3d 1222, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 47 Id. at 1245. 
 48 Id. at 1252. 
 49 Id. at 1256. 
 50 Id. at 1236. 
 51 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012). 
 52 White Stallion, 748 F.3d at 1236. 
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contend EPA must consider the costs of implementing and complying with 
HAP emissions standards for EGUs in its analysis of designating them for reg-
ulation.53 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Clean Air Act (“CAA” or the “Act”) was enacted in 1970 to improve 
the Nation’s air resources and to promote public health and welfare.54 Section 
112 of the Act sets National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
(“HAPs”).55 It also regulates electric utility steam generating units (“EGUs”).56 
Congress directed that prior to listing an EGU for regulation, the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) must conduct a study of the hazards to public 
health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of HAP emissions, after the 
imposition of the other requirements of section 112.57 EPA must regulate 
EGUs if the EPA Administrator (the “Administrator”) finds that it is “appropri-
ate and necessary” to do so after considering the results of the study.58 The Su-
preme Court of the United States has long acknowledged that EPA should be 
granted considerable deference in its interpretation and implementation of the 
CAA.59 
In addition to section 112, Congress also initiated three other significant 
regulatory programs for stationary pollution sources: National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (“NAAQS”), State Implementation Plans (“SIPs”), and New 
Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”), authorized under sections 109, 110, 
and 111 respectively.60 The Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit have addressed the consideration of costs for each of these 
regulatory programs.61 
The Supreme Court held that EPA is altogether barred from considering 
costs when setting NAAQS under section 109.62 In Whitman v. American 
Trucking Associations, the Court held that section 109 requires explicit author-
ization for EPA to consider costs in setting NAAQS.63 The Court explained 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Id. 
 54 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2012). 
 55 Id. § 7412(d)(1). 
 56 Id. § 7412(n)(1)(A). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844–45 (1984) (noting 
that EPA is entitled to deference when interpreting the CAA). 
 60 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409−7412 (2012); History of the Clean Air Act, supra note 6. 
 61 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 467–68 (2001); Union Elec. Co. v. U.S. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 252–53 (1976); Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency 824 F.2d 1146, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1987); ASARCO Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 578 F.2d 319, 
329–30 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 62 Whitman, 531 U.S. at 467–68; see infra notes 63−66 and accompanying text. 
 63 531 U.S. at 467–68. 
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that because subsequent amendments to the Act have explicitly authorized or 
directed EPA to consider implementation and compliance costs, the omission 
by Congress of similar language in section 109 was intentional.64 The Court 
also examined the statutory and historical context of the CAA and found that 
because the primary purpose of the Act is to protect public health, Congress 
intended to bar EPA from considering implementation and compliance costs, 
which can interrupt that purpose.65 The Whitman Court stated that implementa-
tion and compliance costs can never be a factor in EPA’s consideration of de-
velopment and implementation of NAAQS because “[cost] is both so indirect-
ly related to public health and so full of potential for canceling the conclusions 
drawn from direct health effects that it would surely have been expressly men-
tioned in . . . [section] 109 had Congress meant it to be considered.”66 
The Supreme Court has also held that EPA is barred from considering im-
plementation and compliance costs when evaluating a SIP.67 Authorized under 
section 110, a SIP is a NAAQS compliance plan designed by individual states 
and submitted to EPA for approval.68 In Union Electric Co. v. U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, the Supreme Court considered a petition from a 
Missouri electric utility company to review EPA’s approval of a SIP establish-
ing sulfur dioxide emission standards.69 The Court found that the Act and its 
amendments subjected the states to strict minimum compliance requirements 
that might appear economically infeasible.70 The Court reasoned that EPA 
could not consider costs in SIP approval decisions because Congress deliber-
ately excluded an authorization to do so.71 The Court also noted that the 1990s 
CAA amendments reflected congressional dissatisfaction with the progress of 
existing air pollutant programs and concluded that an amendment’s silence on 
the issue of cost evinces the legislature’s commitment to public health, regard-
less of economic feasibility.72 
Similarly, with regard to the NSPS, the third major regulatory program, 
the D.C. Circuit, in ASARCO Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
held that EPA is precluded from considering implementation and compliance 
costs when considering whether a facility is subject to the NSPS under section 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 490–91. 
 66 Id. at 469. 
 67 Union Elec., 427 U.S. at 252–53. 
 68 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2012). 
 69 427 U.S. at 252–53. 
 70 Id. at 256–58. 
 71 Id. at 257 n.5 (explaining that if Congress wanted EPA to consider costs it would expressly say 
so). 
 72 See id. at 249, 256–58 (noting EPA Administrator should not be concerned with factors that are 
not specified). 
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111.73 In ASARCO, the D.C. Circuit concluded that EPA was barred from con-
sidering costs when deciding whether a copper smelting facility is subject to 
the NSPS.74 Section 111 allows EPA to consider costs in setting the NSPS, but 
explicitly disallows it from doing so when determining whether the standards 
will apply to plants or to individual facilities within those plants.75 Judge Le-
venthal’s concurrence stated, “costs may not be considered in determining 
whether a facility will be subject to an NSPS . . . .”76 
Courts have found that with regard to National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants (“NESHAPs”), section 112 authorizes EPA to con-
sider implementation and compliance costs when setting the appropriate regu-
latory levels.77 Before EPA can do this, however, it must first make an initial 
determination of safety based exclusively on the risk to public health at a par-
ticular emission level.78 The D.C. Circuit, in Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, held that the CAA mandate to 
provide “an ample margin of safety” requires EPA to make an initial determi-
nation of what is safe—a determination that must be based solely on risk to 
health—and further stated that “[EPA] cannot under any circumstances consid-
er cost and technological feasibility at this stage of the analysis.”79 Thus, the 
court held that before EPA can set a level of regulation under section 112, it 
must make an initial safety judgment with no regard to costs of implementa-
tion or compliance.80 
III. ANALYSIS 
In White Stallion Energy Center v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency’s (EPA) Final Rule, holding that the agency is not required to 
consider implementation and compliance costs in listing decisions for electric 
utility steam generating units (“EGUs”).81 The court affirmed EPA’s conclu-
sion in the Final Rule that it is inappropriate to require the Agency to consider 
implementation and compliance costs when setting regulations of EGUs be-
cause, whereas cost consideration is authorized elsewhere in the Clean Air Act 
                                                                                                                           
 73 ASARCO Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 578 F.2d 319, 329–30 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 74 Id. at 320−21, 329–30. 
 75 Id. at 329. 
 76 Id. at 329–30. 
 77 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (2012); see Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 824 
F.2d 1146, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating EPA Administrator must first determine the level of attain-
able emissions and then determine the costs). 
 78 Natural Res. Def. Council, 824 F.2d at 1164. 
 79 Id. at 1164–65. 
 80 See id. 
 81 748 F.3d 1222, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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(“CAA” or the “Act”), it is never addressed in the provision regarding EGUs.82 
The court noted that when language is included in one section of a statute, but 
excluded from another, it likely reflects a deliberate intent by Congress.83 The 
court also found EPA’s interpretation to not consider costs is consistent with 
the congressional intent to encourage regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants 
(“HAPs”).84 Whereas petitioners argued that the provision’s “appropriate and 
necessary” threshold compelled a consideration of costs, the court found that 
EPA’s evaluation of the results of the pollutant study determine whether 
sources are in fact “appropriate” to regulate.85 
Although the White Stallion court affirmed EPA’s conclusion in the Final 
Rule that the Agency is not required to consider costs when designating EGUs 
for regulation, it also agreed that such a consideration is not altogether prohib-
ited.86 This reading of section 112 diverges sharply from previous Supreme 
Court and D.C. Circuit interpretations of sections 109, 110, and 111, which 
expressly prohibit EPA from considering implementation and compliance costs 
when setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”), approving 
or rejecting State Implementation Plans (“SIPs”), and listing new sources sub-
ject to New Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”).87 
Despite the fact that the holding in White Stallion is anomalous on the is-
sue of cost, courts have repeatedly referenced the same two reasons to justify 
limiting or prohibiting the role of implementation and compliance cost consid-
erations under CAA stationary source regulatory programs.88 First, costs ac-
counted for elsewhere in the statute evince Congress’s deliberate intent to ex-
clude concerns of economic feasibility from the stationary source regulatory 
programs.89 Second, the provisions’ silence on the issue of costs is consistent 
                                                                                                                           
 82 Id. at 1238. 
 83 Id. at 1237. 
 84 Id. at 1238. 
 85 See id. at 1233, 1239. 
 86 Id. at 1237, 1241. 
 87 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (holding cost considerations 
are barred during the setting of NAAQS); Union Elec. Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 
265 (1976) (refusing to consider economic feasibility during SIP approval process); ASARCO Inc. v. 
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 578 F.2d 319, 329–30 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating cost considerations can be 
applied to some aspects of NSPS listings, but not others). 
 88 See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 471; Union Elec., 427 U.S. at 265; White Stallion, 748 F.3d at 1237, 
1241; Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 824 F.2d 1146, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 
ASARCO, 578 F.2d at 329–30. 
 89 See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 467 (noting they will not extend cost considerations that have been 
expressly granted elsewhere in the statute); Union Elec., 427 U.S. at 257 n.5 (explaining that if Con-
gress wanted EPA to consider economic feasibility, it would expressly say so); White Stallion, 748 
F.3d at 1237 (noting language included in one section of a statute, but omitted in another, reflects 
congressional intent not to require consideration of costs); ASARCO, 578 F.2d at 329–30 (noting that 
Congress explicitly provided for cost consideration in the emissions-level-setting process, not the 
initial determination of whether a source should be regulated). 
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with Congress’s intent to protect public health without regard for economic 
feasibility.90 The White Stallion court’s affirmation of EPA’s conclusion that 
section 112 does not prohibit cost consideration is inconsistent with a faithful 
reading of the CAA.91 
All stationary source regulatory programs are enacted under the CAA, 
and thus they share the common purpose of the CAA: to protect human health 
and the environment.92 The courts in Whitman v. American Trucking Associa-
tions, Union Electric Co. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and 
ASARCO, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, all stated that the pub-
lic health goals of the provisions considered by each court—sections 109, 110, 
and 111, respectively—precluded considering implementation and compliance 
costs for initial program determinations.93 Similarly, the White Stallion court 
also cited the legislative purpose as a reason that EPA should not be required to 
consider implementation and compliance costs when deciding whether it is 
“appropriate and necessary” to regulate EGUs.94 Based on the plain statutory 
language, it is evident that Congress intended all four of the stationary source 
regulatory programs—authorized in sections 109, 110, 111, and 112—to priori-
tize public health concerns over economic costs by prohibiting cost considera-
tions in determinations of regulatory designation.95 
The courts have held, in Whitman, Union Electric, and ASARCO, that 
EPA is barred from considering implementation and compliance costs when 
setting NAAQS, approving or rejecting SIPs, and listing new sources subject 
to the NSPS, because Congress deliberately foreclosed the possibility by mak-
ing no mention of costs in those provisions.96 This reading of the CAA is con-
                                                                                                                           
 90 See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 492 (noting the main responsibility Congress cognized of in passing 
the Act was to protect public safety without regard to economic feasibility); Union Elec., 427 U.S. at 
258 (finding first responsibility is to protect public health rather than economic feasibility); White 
Stallion, 748 F.3d at 1240 (noting CAA amendments reflect Congress’s intent to remedy public health 
hazards); ASARCO, 578 F.2d at 327 (noting NSPS standards are designed to protect and improve air 
quality). 
 91 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2012) (stating the purpose of the CAA is to protect 
human health and welfare); White Stallion, 748 F.3d. at 1241 (holding EPA is not prohibited from 
considering costs of EGU mercury regulations); DePalma, supra note 5 (discussing adverse health 
effects of Mercury). 
 92 See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (noting the purpose of the CAA subchapters are to promote public 
health and welfare). 
 93 See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 492 (noting Congress’s main responsibility in the Act was to protect 
public safety without regard to economic feasibility); Union Elec., 427 U.S. at 258 (finding first re-
sponsibility is to protect public health rather than economic feasibility); ASARCO, 578 F.2d at 327 
(noting NSPS standards are designed to protect and improve air quality). 
 94 See White Stallion, 748 F.3d. at 1236 (noting Congress’s amendment of the CAA and emphasis 
on public health). 
 95 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409–7411; see Whitman, 531 U.S. at 492; Union Elec., 427 U.S. at 258; White 
Stallion, 748 F.3d at 1240; ASARCO, 578 F.2d at 327. 
 96 See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 467 (noting the Court will not extend cost considerations that have 
been expressly granted elsewhere in statute); Union Elec., 427 U.S. at 257 n.5 (explaining that if Con-
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sistent with the plain statutory language.97 For example, section 109 provides 
that NAAQS are set, based on certain criteria, at a level necessary to provide a 
sufficient margin of safety to protect public health, but makes no mention of 
cost considerations in setting NAAQS.98 Similarly, there is no reference to cost 
consideration governing the approval of SIPs in section 110 and further, none 
of the eight factors enumerated in section 110 allow for a consideration of 
costs.99 In the case of the NSPS, the only criteria mentioned in section 111 for 
including a source category is a finding by EPA that the source could jeopard-
ize public health.100 
Similarly, section 112(n)(1)(A) governing EGUs emphasizes the results of 
a pollution study, but allows no consideration of other factors—notably im-
plementation and compliance costs.101 The White Stallion court refused to im-
port such a cost consideration into EGU regulatory designation decisions by 
using similar arguments relied upon by past courts, such as statutory construc-
tion and legislative intent.102 At least one court has found that section 112 re-
quires EPA to ignore costs in forming an initial determination of what level of 
safety is necessary to protect public health.103 In Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the D.C. Circuit held that an 
initial determination of safety should be made, and that it should be consistent 
with the statutory requirement to provide an ample margin of safety.104 Such an 
initial determination requirement is consistent with the regulatory procedure 
for other stationary source programs.105 
                                                                                                                           
gress wanted EPA to consider economic feasibility, it would expressly say so); ASARCO, 578 F.2d at 
329–30 (noting that Congress explicitly provided for cost consideration in the emissions level setting 
process, not the initial determination of whether a source should be regulated). 
 97 See infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 98 See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012) (declining to mention costs in setting NAAQS). 
 99 See id. § 7410(a)(2) (declining to mention costs at SIP approval stage). 
 100 See id. § 7411(a)(1)(A) (stating public health, not costs, factor into listing of sources). 
 101 See id. § 7412(n)(1)(A). The provision states, “The Administrator shall regulate electric utility 
steam generating units under this section, if the Administrator finds such regulation is appropriate and 
necessary after considering the results of the study required by this subparagraph.” Id. 
 102 See White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 748 F.3d 1222, 1241 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014) (holding EPA reasonably excluded costs from determination regarding EGUs); supra note 
88–89 and accompanying text (discussing instruction that courts will not import cost requirement into 
programs where expressly granted elsewhere in CAA and noting courts find importation of cost re-
quirement contrary to congressional intent). 
 103 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 824 F.2d 1146, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
 104 Id. 
 105 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001) (noting that the NAAQS-
setting process is an “initial calculation” to ensure an adequate margin of safety to protect public 
health); Union Elec. Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 258–59 (1976) (holding that the 
first responsibility is protecting public health, not making technological or economic judgments); 
White Stallion, 748 F.3d at 1240 (characterizing the decision of whether to list EGUs as subject to 
regulation as EPA’s “initial decision”); Natural Res. Def. Council, 824 F.2d at 1164 (noting the im-
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If EPA had ruled that the agency is prohibited from considering costs 
when making an initial determination designating EGUs for regulation, the 
D.C. Circuit would likely have affirmed its decision.106 The courts have been 
consistent in upholding EPA’s faithful imputation of the CAA’s purpose to pro-
tect public health in its interpretation of the stationary source regulation provi-
sions.107 An interpretation of section 112 that would allow adverse health con-
sequences in deference to considerations of implementation and compliance 
costs is not faithful to the plain language of—or the congressional intent be-
hind—the CAA, and thus both public health and the environment would have 
been better served if EPA had interpreted section 112 as prohibiting implemen-
tation and compliance cost considerations in initial determinations of EGU 
designation for regulation.108 
CONCLUSION 
As the largest generator of mercury emissions in the United States, elec-
tric utility steam generating units, or EGUs, pose a serious threat to public 
health. In White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v. U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld EPA’s Final 
Rule that the agency is not required to consider implementation and compli-
ance costs when designating EGUs for regulation under the Clean Air Act. Had 
EPA written the Final Rule to strictly prohibit implementation and compliance 
costs from being considered in its EGU listing decisions, Supreme Court and 
D.C. Circuit precedent suggests that the court would have affirmed its interpre-
tation. This stance is decidedly stronger than the agency’s current position that 
it is merely “not required” to consider such costs in light of the statutory text, 
the legislative intent underlying the CAA, and the decisions in Whitman v. 
                                                                                                                           
portance of health at the initial determination phase); ASARCO Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 578 
F.2d 319, 329–30 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (distinguishing the determination of whether a facility will be 
subject to an NSPS from the determination of the level at which the emissions standard should be set). 
 106 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844–45 (1984) (holding 
that the Court defers to EPA in matters of CAA interpretation). Compare White Stallion, 748 F.3d at 
1241 (allowing EPA to ignore costs in designating EGUs for regulation, but declining to grant express 
prohibition on cost considerations), with Whitman, 531 U.S. at 471 (noting that the CAA explicitly 
bars costs from the NAAQS-setting process), and Union Elec., 427 U.S. at 265–66 (stating economic 
infeasibility cannot play a role in requirements to meet CAA standards). 
 107 See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2012) (stating the purpose of the CAA is to promote public health 
and welfare); Whitman, 531 U.S. at 492 (noting Congress’ main responsibility in the CAA was to 
protect public safety without regard to economic feasibility); Union Elec., 427 U.S. at 258 (finding 
first responsibility is to protect public health rather than economic feasibility). 
 108 See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1); White Stallion, 748 F.3d at 1241 (declining to grant express pro-
hibition of cost considerations when designating EGUs for regulation); Regulatory Findings on the 
Emission of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Electric Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 
79,827 (Envtl. Prot. Agency Dec. 20, 2000) (notice) (stating EGUs are the largest source of Mercury 
emissions in the United States); DePalma, supra note 5 (discussing adverse health effects of Mercu-
ry). 
606 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 42:593 
American Trucking Associations, Union Electric Co. v. U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, and ASARCO Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agen-
cy. If EPA decided that considering implementation and compliance costs is 
not allowed as a factor in regulatory listing decisions, it would have effectively 
shut the door on future petitions to involve cost considerations in initial regula-
tory determinations for EGUs. Removing cost considerations from the deter-
minative calculus of whether to regulate EGUs would, in turn, better effectuate 
CAA public health and environmental protection goals, and thus better pro-
mote Congress’s intention to protect the environment. 
